Discussion of the quantity of bread consumed is a prelude to an analysis of the political problems of production and distribution. Bread's place in the diet was influenced by a complex political system that is usually studied in the context of imperial politics and Bourbon reforms. Attention to external influences had shaped the way historians look at eighteenth-century Latin American politics, with consequent emphasis on the introduction of administrative and tax reforms, and the replacement of Spanish American officials with those from Spain 3 . The reforms are important, but they overshadow the real dynamics of late colonial society, the local contest over the distribution of resources vital to the survival of the community. Emphasis on international economic patterns acts in a similar way, blurring the reality of local life. The "dependency" approach, which insists on seeing Latin America as primarily a response to external influences, cannot entirely explain the politics of food. The evidence brought together here points to local interests rather than external ones as the most critical in determining food supplies in Mexico City. Part II of the article evaluates the conflicting interests and problems associated with bread as Mexico City grew, emphasizing local responses to changes in the bread trade. Mexico City consumed a staggering amount of wheat bread in the late eighteenth century, though the actual amount is subject to interpretations of standards of measurements and faith in contemporary statistics. Indeed, there is not even any direct quantitative evidence on the amount of bread eaten. Documents speak only to the amount of flour consumed. Table I lists several of the estimates made during the last part of the century, proving that an enormous amount of flour, well over 100,000 cargas, circulated in the city each year. In order to determine what the figures mean it is first necessary to convert the carga to an acceptable equivalency. The best discussion of measurements for this purpose is found in Enrique Florescano's "Precios del maíz y crisis agrícolas en México (1708-1810)". Florescano , whose work depended on the careful definition of units of measurement, surveyed much of the literature and concluded that a carga of flour weighed 149.578 kilograms, but at the same time cautioned that more research was needed on eighteenth-century metrology 4 . Evidence from my work confirms the need for caution. One example from 1792 will suffice. Inspectors weighing individual cargas gave weights ranging from 9 arrobas (arroba = 25 pounds) 16 libras (libra = 16 ounces) to 14 arrobas 20 libras, or 111.05 kilograms to 168.66 kilograms. Their basic unit of measurement was the tercio (2 tercios = 1 carga) rather than the fanega (4 fanegas = 1 carga) s . Weight differences must have been caused by the density of the grain, the moisture content, and the purity of the milling process. With such discrepancies, I hesitate to convert the cargas in Table I to kilograms.
The second problem is complicated by the difficulty in resolving the first. How much bread from a determined amount of grain? The evidence is contradictory. Alexander von Humboldt, a good source, says that 130,000 cargas of flour produced 49,900,000 libras of bread, or a conversion ratio of flour to bread of 1.28 6 . Careful measurements in the 1790s gave different results. From two cargas of flour, panaderos (bakers) made 387 tortas (loaves) of 26.5 ounces each, or 640.97 pounds of bread, giving a conversion ratio of 1.33. In this example the evidence is solid enough to accept that each carga weighed 241 pounds (111.05 kilograms) 7 . What we have then are different estimates for the carga and for the ratio of flour to bread.
The above arithmetic assumes meaning only if Mexico City consumed most of the flour. The sources mentioned in Table I specifically refer to flour consumed in the city, and contemporaries noted that most of the food coming into the city was actually consumed there 8 . The export trade in grain depended on the valleys to the south, so it is unlikely that grain was routed through the city. Mexico City did not serve as an entrepot for the grain trade. Some grain by-products from the manufacture of flour in Mexico City did go to other areas, but this did not limit the flour available for bread 9 . Estimate on daily consumption can be arrived at by using the ratios previously given to determine bread production and then dividing by population. It is sufficient here to give Humboldt's conclusion that each inhabitant ate 363 pounds (162.5 kilograms) of bread per year. Here he is apparently using the population figure accepted for 1803 (137,466) rather than for 1790 (112,926). His conclusion places the diet of Mexico City much closer to that of European cities, where residents consumed about a pound of bread a day, than to Indian communities dependent primarily on maize 10 .
I want to emphasize that I am not implying that every resident of the city ate that much bread, or any bread at all for that matter. The purpose of the discussion has been to demonstrate the importance of wheat bread rather than to give a specific estimate on the amount actually consumed. Comparisons with the use of other foods confirm the primacy of wheat. Juan Ramirez de Alzate in his calculations of foods eaten in 1790 listed wheat (42,250,000 pounds) as far more important than maize (30,000,000 pounds) in the capital's diet 11 . Once again, the figures can be quarreled with, but the centrality of wheat in the diet is indisputable.
Interpretations of consumption patterns in the past often have to rely on more than statistical evidence. In Mexico City, the emergence of several types of bread further confirm the numerical evidence, and also illustrate the widespread use of bread in the diet by different social and ethnic groups.
Speciality breads and pastries delighted those who could afford them, but did not figure as subsistence foods. did meet daily nutritional needs. With each, the simple principle of the higher the price the more privileged the consumer served to identify breads with particular social groups. The most delicate and carefully refined bread was alternatively referred to as pan esquisito, privilegio, or more usually pan francés, a food only for the wealthy, those with refined and educated palates 12 . More popular but still limited to consumers of social and economic advantage was pan floreado, a bread made from good wheats with a substantial part of the bran removed. Most of the poor ate pan común, made from poor wheats with much of the bran remaining. Some authorities recognized that pan común was more nutritious than floreado, even though it was less expensive 13 . A fourth bread, pan baso, baked from the hardest grains with little attention to milling and bolting, fed those on the margin of society. Often they were Indians who ate either pan baso or tortillas, depending on price. By this time tortillas, associated with squalor and Indian life, lacked any of the appeal so eloquently described by Francisco Hernández two centuries earlier. Tortillas were compared to a bread so bad that it was fit only for dogs 14 .
The whiteness of bread was important to consumers. I have found a few specific references associating white bread with good bread, suggesting that it rewarded both palate and health. Consumers thought trigo trigueño the ideal wheat, since it was perfectly yellow and suitable for the finest breads 15 16 . Medical opinion influenced the history of bread in another way in the eighteenth century. Custom called for the distribution of foods that did not meet official standards to the poor as a part of the general system of the beneficio de los pobres, a complex mechanism of social welfare supported by the public and private sectors of the city. Panaderos figured prominently in the system, since their confiscated bread fed convicts, orphans, and the "innumerable poor"
17 . The new emphasis on chemistry and nutrition threatened the system. Social custom clashed with medical knowledge when some argued that bad flour should not even be thrown into the sea because it would contaminate the fish. Giving it to the poor was a violation of natural and divine law 18 . Admittedly, the hyperbole was unusual, but the principle it demonstrates was increasingly evident in the late eighteenth century 19 .
Perhaps the new ideas influenced the spokesman for the pulperos (shopkeepers) of Mexico City when he criticized standard beliefs about bread. Accepted wisdom spoke of the poor as little better than animals who simply wanted to fill their bellies. They had concern only for quantity, not quality, and certainly not taste. The spokesman challenged the view, demanding that the poor along with the rich had the right to good breads. To counter the view that the poor had "uniformly crude and rough palates", he pointed to the poor who became wealthy, or the wealthy who became poor 20 .
Bread distribution in addition to quality had social implica- tions. The needs of the poor were always mentioned in the prolonged arguments over who had the right to sell what bread. The crown had an obligation to see that bread was available to the poor. It was not simply a question of production, of enough bread for the populace, but of creating and supporting an extensive distribution system to help the poor, those who worked long hours and lived far from the bakeries. Pulperos viewed themselves as central in such a system, more important than panaderos because they served a larger population 21 .
Flour statistics, diverse bread types, and social attitudes about bread prove the importance of bread in the diet. Instead of feeding only a small European elite as in the sixteenth century, bread now nourished much of the city. Spaniards, Indians, and mixed groups regularly included it in their diet. By the end of the eighteenth century, habit and preference demanded an adequate supply of bread for life in the city to continue in its customary way. Consumer expectations and the divergent interests of groups associated with the bread trade led to a series of complex political problems.
II
The politics of any food item can be approached from different perspectives. Emphasis in the following discussion is on the concern of municipal government with the maintenance of a regular supply of bread. The interplay between regulatory objective and the changing reality of city life determined the history of bread. For Mexico City, the provisioning of bread required solutions to the problems of production, distribution, quality, pricing, and the introduction of a new form of currency. A regular supply of good bread required an administration capable of overcoming the many obstacles to supplying a low priced, good quality bread throughout the city. To provide some background to the problems, attention is first given to the bread laws which existed in the eighteenth century, and then to the attempts at an imperial solution to the problems of provisioning.
Maintenance of a regular supply of bread was entrusted to the office of the Fiel Ejecutoría, composed of members of local government and at times a representative of the crown. The actions of the Fiel Ejecutoria usually followed guidelines established in the ordenanzas of 1717. The ordenanzas, a comprehensive code regulating most foods in the city, contained a battery of decrees designed to insure the quality and adequate distribution of bread. Panaderos had to bake pan floreado and común separately, thus reducing the chances of mixing wheats or flours. They had to mark individual loaves with registered seals, and agree to bake breads of specified size and price according to the quality of the grains used. The code also regulated distribution, prohibiting panaderos from leaving their shops until 7 a.m. and requiring them to sell at assigned stations. Finally, many regulatory devices -panaderos had to report the flour they bought, the quantity baked, agree to inspections -gave the Fiel Ejecutoría legal control over the panaderos 22 .
Regulatory attempts based on the ordenanzas continued until 1770 when the Visitador General, José de Gálvez, tried to reorganize the production and pricing of bread. His efforts were only a small part of a broad reform movement initiated by the Bourbon monarchs to revamp the political, economic, and military structure of Mexico. The actions of Gálvez are worthy of consideration because the local reaction to them helps to explain bread as a political issue, not because they altered the basic power relationships associated with bread.
Three of Gálvez's reforms provoked particularly loud complaints. First, he tried to reduce the size of the guild of panaderos from 74 members to 36, then to 30. Panaderos whose livelihood was threatened marshalled all of the evidence possible to insure inclusion in the select list. Some of them, previously bankrupt by the vagaries of the bread trade, pleaded for mercy, invariably pointing to their years of service and the many children they had to support. Others than owners faced unemployment. The con-sulado of Mexico (merchant organization) estimated that 80 Spanish and 150 Indian families would loose their jobs; just as serious, less bread would be available in fewer locations if the reform was enacted 23 . More threatening to the poor and to the officials who had to control them was the reduction in the weight of bread from 16 to 13 ounces, interpreted by opponents as a crude device for taxing the poor. While reducing the size of a loaf (thus increasing panaderos' profits), Gálvez proposed an increase on the taxes that they paid on every 10 cargas of flour. The proposal rested on the belief that costs in baking did not increase in proportion to output. The more bakers produced, the larger the return on capital invested. Additional income would come from a reduction of the profits of pulperos and from the quartilla, the traditional tax paid by members of the baker's guild. Financial projections anticipated that the new arrangement would generate 143,362 pesos of revenue a year 24 .
All of the revenue was destined for Gálvez's third reform, the creation of a pósito (granary) for Mexico city. Contemporary political thinking, based on the belief that the crown had responsibility for the supply of grain, called for a public granary as a principle of good government. Since the sixteenth century, efforts had been made to establish both an alhóndiga (public market) and pósito for wheat. The alhóndiga and pósito used for maize in the seventeenth century may have been built originally for wheat, but the uncertainty of the supply of maize led to their use as a maize depository 25 . Now a wheat pósito was needed to 23) AGI, México, 2779, "Reglamento del Gremio", 1770; Juan de Castaniza, 13 July 1771; "Testimonio de los autos. ..", 20 Sept. 1770. For an appreciation of the problem of bread within the general context of Gálvez's many reforms, the best account is still Herbert Ingram Priestly, José de Gálvez, Visitador-General of New Spain (1795-1771), (Berkeley, 1916 Arguments against the pósito emphasized that the city did not need a granary since surpluses of grain were more common than shortages. Mexico City sat in the center of a productive zone that stretched from the Bajío in the northwest to the fertile valleys of Puebla in the southeast. In order to survive, farmers had to search beyond Mexico City for markets, which soon led to the rise of Veracruz as a wheat port. Molinos (mills) stored from 50,000 to 80,000 cargas of wheat for farmers during average years 26 . Only if one bad harvest followed another, something that happened only once every 30 to 50 years, did a crisis exist. Simply stated, the pósito represented an unnecessary and expensive solution to a minor problem 27 .
The arguments point to an aspect of Mexican history that needs careful investigation. The plight of the eighteenth-century wheat farmer appears to have been the bounteous nature of the temperate basins of central Mexico. Farmers had to move quickly to find markets for their wheat, discounting prices before grains spoiled. Much of the other evidence discussed in this essay indirectly supports the conclusion of Mexico as a grain rich country. Except for the inevitable exception (the catastrophic year of 1785), the grain and bread problems of Mexico City were not shortages, but artifical prices, bad quality and inadequate distribution.
The pósito was not established. The new guild collapsed. Even memory of the food riots of 1622 and 1692 did not generate enough support for the pósito', after all, the riots, according to popular perception, were caused by maize not wheat shortages 28 . Aspirations for the pósito continued despite Gálvez's failure. Incidents such as the difficulty panaderos faced in obtaining wheat from millers in 1780 led to renewed calls for opósito, and even to extensive -though unsuccessful -archival searches to find evidence of the functioning of earlier alhóndigas and pósitos for wheat 29 . Gálvez's reforms failed to alter the nature of the bread trade. The failure is only one example of the difficulties faced in reorganizing the economic life of Mexico. What is significant about the reform effort was its focus on one institution, the guild of panaderos, instead of on the general system of production and exchange that was taking shape in the late eighteenth century. The struggle to regulate the system, so extensive and dynamic, was the main objective of local government.
The movement of grain and flour was so complicated and rife with opportunity for illegal profit that baffled officials never entirely understood it. Farmers shipped their grain to mills just outside Mexico City, which stored the grain until purchased by panaderos. The mills served as the warehouses and markets, holding grain in vast bins, labelled according to province 30 . Farmers and millers used their control to falsify weights and quality, hold grain off the market, and give preference to selected customers. Illegal practices of this sort annoyed and frustrated authorities, but they saved their true outrage for the regatones, those traders who completely ignored fixed prices and authorized locations to buy and sell for their own profit. So much emphasis has been given to regatones in Mexican history that it is tempting to interpret them as a unique product of the Mexican experience, a consequence of a corrupt and inefficient political system. The truth is less dramatic, and less damaging to the reputation of Mexican politics. Forestallers and engrossers profit when clashes occur between economic regulation and economic reality. The experiences of English colonial cities in the eigh- teenth century reveal similar practices. A quote from the Boston Evening Post in 1748 hints that matters were even worse there than in Mexico: "It has been computed, that there are above one thousand able bodied Men in the Towns not far from Boston who have wholly left off Labour, and are turn'd Butchers, and Forestallers, and their Practice is, to buy up, and at any Rate, Cattle, Sheep, Calves, Fowles, etc., (dead or alive) to sell out at an exhorbitant Price in Boston" 31 . Millers had a particularly powerful position since they sat between farmer and baker, and with careful attention could profit from both. Fifteen millers, supposedly avaricious men who acted with little regard for the public good, controlled the movement of grain and flour into the city in 1780. Farmers and panaderos, often desperately short of funds, turned to millers as credit agencies, accepting reduced prices, or in the case of panaderos, paying more than the legal price and receiving inferior grain. The crown hoped to correct the situation by imposing strict accounting procedures on the mills. Gone would be the days when foremen measured "by eye". Legislation now required millers to weigh carefully all grains, note types, sources, prices, and dates of purchase. The insistence that farmers account for all their sales to millers brought regulation full circle, theoretically limiting the chances for illegal gain 32 .
After panaderos bought the flour and turned it into bread, new and more intractable problems arose. Panaderos relied on four main channels of distribution, the relative importance of each changing as legislation attempted to curb abuses in the bread trade. They sold in their own shops, in adjacent stores, in the infamous puestos de madera (stands on corners and in public plazas), and most importantly, in the pulperías, defined as stores with goods totalling at least 1,000 pesos, but in practice any small, general goods store 33 . All of them were microcosms of activity, serving the vital function of distributing bread to an incre- asingly disjointed city, crowded with people trying to stay alive. Within each distribution center, individuals and families earned a few pesos to buy necessities. Some of the distribution points were shelters for an increasingly large and homeless population that wandered the streets by day and sought refuge anywhere at night. Thus arose the criticism of the bugs and human filth that contaminated the stalls and small shops 34 . Of the many different relationships between panaderos and distributors, the one most resistant to change was with the pulperos. Legislation could simply forbid the stalls on street corners or selling from baskets, but it could not eliminate ties between panaderos and pulperos. The committment to the widespread distribution of bread always envisioned panaderos selling wholesale and pulperos retail. Neither pulperos nor panaderos hesitated to act on perceptions of their own role in the process to influence food policy. They exaggerated the social and economic importance of their particular position in provisioning the city, playing upon it at every opportunity to discredit each other. The conflict between them became so intense in the late eighteenth century that one official complained that "the matter of pulperos and panaderos has occupied the attention of the government more than any other" 35 . The observation did not exaggerate the political implications of the struggle for control over the bread trade.
Deception and fraud became inseparable from the distribution process as panaderos neglected standards of quality and price. Pulperos did the same, and since they dealt directly with a larger group of consumers, their actions prompted more criticism. Greed and cupidity caused some of the problems. In order to increase earnings, panaderos committed the crime of selling bad bread to the pulperos who committed the dual crimes of receiving the bread ánd retailing it to the public 36 .
Greed was only partly responsible for the illegal characteristics of the bread trade, as some obervers were well aware. Survival in the trade, especially for the new panaderos and pulperos, came only through challenging traditional wholesale-retail relationships. Panaderos with limited resources competed with the more established panaderos (who did profit by adhering to official prices) by securing the services of as many pulperos as possible, promising profits beyond those set by law. To compensate for the increased cost, they baked bad or shortweighted bread. Pulperos did not hesitate to accept the new and attractive financial arrangements 37 . By the end of the century, aspiring panaderos had difficulty competing. A healthy middle sector still produced bread, but it was threatened by the control held by a few individuals. Data presented in Tables II and III outlining panadería-pulpería relationships demonstrate that the top 19 percent of panaderías controlled 41 percent of the pulperías, while the bottom 19 percent had no pulperías at all. An analysis of the value of bread sold (Table II) suggests even greater inequality, with 19 percent of the panaderías controlling 44 percent of the total value of bread sold, while the bottom BO percent controlled only 6 percent. When multiple ownerships are considered, the extent of concentration is more striking. By the 1790s, three men controlled much of the bread trade: Francisco Lojo, Francisco Aspiros, and Joaquin de Aldama owned 17 percent of the bakeries, controlled 36 percent of the retail stores, and sold 29 percent of the wholesable bread 38 .
Tab. II

Panadería-Pulpería
The production and distribution of bread became more concentrated as the number of pulperías increased. In 1777, some 472 pulperías and stands sold bread; by the 1790s the number was so large that officials complained of the lack of a comprehensive list of them 39 . To satisfy the clamour for bread by some pulperías, officials initiated a forced redistribution oí panaderías and pulperías hoping to guarantee supplies and markets. Now panaderías had to sell to selected pulperías, who in turn could only buy from those panaderías. The problem supervising such an arrangement led to failure, and soon many pulperías claimed a lack of bread 40 . The increasing complexity of the bread trade defied a solution as simple as the forced distribution oí pulperías. It was folly to think that the regulatory mechanisms used earlier to control bread, mainly the periodic inspection of 15 mills and 40 or 50 bakeries, would suffice to regulate the relationships between hundreds of enterprises. The failure to provide for the widespread distribution of pan común threatened the bureaucratic ideal of pan común as an inexpensive, nutritious bread for the lower classes, a staple available day and night in all parts of the city. In the hopes of finding another solution to the lack of bread in pulperías, the Fiel Ejecutoría interviewed 151 pulperos who claimed they sold no pan común. The pulperos reported that they had trouble acquiring the bread since many panaderos did not bake it. More frequently, they responded that customers found the bread so unappetizing that they refused to buy it 41 .
The problems of poor quality stretched back to 1774, when two guilds produced bread, one común the other floreado. By separating the production process, control over the quality of grains (and bread) was easier to insure 42 . As a part of the plan, pulperos had the choice of selling floreado or común, a choice previously denied them. They preferred floreado which helped to undermine the guild of pan común. Panaderos viewed the fall of the guild as a natural response to the greed of the pulperos, who profited more from floreado than común. To increase their share of the floreado market, pulperos waged a campaign against común, discrediting the quality and taste of the bread, even at times refusing to sell it. By working out an arrangement with a panadero oí floreado, they could sell the higher priced bread at a better profit 43 .
Pulperos responded to the charges by arguing that panaderos produced such a wretched común, made from hard, tasteless wheat, often adulterated, always poorly baked, that shoppers preferred anything else but común. Pulperos had a deeper motive for resisting común. If a standardized bread were agreed to, and enough supplied to stores, then panaderos could argue more effectively for a monopoly over floreado, depriving pulperos of an important source of income 44 .
This is exactly what happened as the arguments for a new pan común gained acceptance. A quality, low priced bread would increase consumption, improve agriculture, stimulate trade, and generate revenue for the crown 45 . To determine the weight and quality of the new bread, officials conducted experiments that had been initially requested in 1777. A team of investigators selected the grain, oversaw its measurement and packaging, and witnessed the milling, bolting, and sifting. At every step,, they weighed the grain and tailings. They also watched the making of the leavening agent, the cutting of the loaves, and the actual baking 46 . The results set the weight of the new común at 26 1/2 ounces, instead of the current 18 1/2 ounces 47 .
Weight not price was the central issue in the debate over the experiments. Prices remained constant, while the size of the loaf fluctuated according to the availability and quality of wheat. Shoppers in Mexico City, like their counterparts in England and the English colonies, where the assize still regulated bread, expected to pay the same price (medio real) for bread every time they shopped, regardless of the wholesale cost of flour 48 .
The earliest eighteenth-century document that I have seen for bread prices is a detailed schedule of costs, weights, expenses, and earnings for panaderos and pulperos published in 1726 and again in 1755. According to the document, changes in official bread prices in Mexico City hinged entirely on the cost of flour, since other costs remained fixed. For example, when flour sold for 5 pesos a carga, the schedule required that each loaf weigh 30 ounces, and that each carga give 140 loaves, equaling a total value in bread of 9 pesos 3 reales. From the total, panaderos earned 1 peso 6 reales and pulperos 1 peso 9 reaies* 9 . As the price of flour increased, the weight of the loaves declined, but their total number increased. The experiments proposed alterations in the price-weight schedule that entailed reevaluating the basic cost factors in the production process: milling, washing, sorting, freighting, bolting, sifting, baking. Once established, the costs remained constant as the price of wheat and the size of the loaf changed.
Panaderos and pulperos had good reason to watch closely procedures that affected their earnings from baking and distribution. In a rare example of agreement, they joined together in denouncing the experiments, criticising everything from the amount of grain used to the unrealistic thoroughness of the workers 50 . Despite their opposition, a new pan común did have a future in Mexico City. The basic question was the weight difference between común and floreado. After considering several proposals, the Fiel Ejecutoría decreed that panaderos produce comun weighing one-third more than floreado and to insure the success of the bread, that panaderos distribute only común, not floreado to pulperos 51 .
The most controversial issue resulting from the experiments was the decision to limit pulperos to pan común. Panaderos enthusiastically supported it, fearing a repeat of 1774, when producers of común were driven out of business 52 . Pulperos pleaded that the restriction would lead to a monopoly by panaderos, followed by a decline in quality and increase in price. The taste of común was still so bad (even after the experiments) that few requested it, preferring to buy just a taste of floreado 53 .
The viceroy hoped to settle the matter in 1793 when he decreed that both panaderos and pulperos had the right to sell común and floreado. The edict had little effect, however, as both groups continued to struggle to improve their position. One of the more interesting developments was the pulpero proposal to establish four factories for the production of both breads which would be independent of the panaderías 54 . Perhaps more than anything else, the plan signaled the arrival of the pulperos as a political force in Mexico City, a challenge to the established power relationships that had so long controlled the movement of bread. The plan was a bold one, slashing at the strong cords that had tied pulperos to panaderos in the eighteenth century. I have not seen an official response to the plan, but its fate is predictable. While pulperos had achieved much, panaderos still had great strength, and it is inconceivable that they would allow such a sweeping reorganization of the bread trade in the city.
Pulperos had more success in their drive to have tlacos, a form of script that they issued to customers, become an accepted medium of exchange. For municipal officials, the increasing circulation of tlacos was one more example of the growing complexity of the food trade, and the indispensable role of pulperos in bread distribution. Concern over tlacos demonstrated a recognition of the different but connected levels of production and distribution. While prices and quality sparked more dramatic conflicts, tlacos influenced the rythm of trade from day to day. They could not be ignored.
Few except pulperos initially wanted tlacos but most recognized that they served a vital economic function. They provided the best medium of exchange for the petty transactions that made up such a large part of the daily economic life of the city. Shoppers at pulperías purchased small amounts of inexpensive items, the total value often coming to less than a medio real (4 tlacos). Pulperos gave shoppers tlacos as change, which really represented credits for future purchases.
Tlacos gave pulperos financial flexibility, increasing the volume of sales and providing a small cushion against declines in business. The successful use of tlacos was at least partly dependent on the skill that pulperos had developed by accepting cacao beans as payment, an ancient medium of exchange that had survived centuries of colonization. They also took personal property as pledges to pay. In effect, pulperías were pawn shops, giving the poor additional opportunities to feed themselves during periods of personal financial crisis 55 . This service of pulperos helps explain why they had become so important to the food distribution system in the late eighteenth century.
Under increasing political pressure, panaderos, along with butchers, candle makers, and others began to accept tlacos. By the 1790s, tlacos circulated in most branches of petty commerce, but not without constant complaint. A serious problem errupted when panaderos demanded that pulperos give them specie in exchange for the tlacos that they had accumulated. Panaderos wanted one real for 9 tlacos, pointing out that this was a 12 1/2 percent gain for pulperos 56 .
The fluid nature of pulpero ownership complicated the exchange of tlacos. With so many pulperos going out of business each year, it was impossible to exchange tlacos. Some pulperos even changed the marks on their tlacos to escape from accepting the old ones, a simple way to eradicate debts. Pork butchers reasoned that they might lose up to 4,000 pesos a year because of the difficulty of exchanging their tlacos for cash 57 .
The policy question was not whether to eliminate tlacos but how to insure their smooth exchange between different financial sectors. Ideas ranged from weekly exchanges to the public minting of tlacos. Viceroy Branciforte finally settled the matter, permitting the panaderos to issue their own tlacos, which were interchangeable with those of pulperoÍ 58 . He had little other choice. Tlacos had become so much a part of the economic system that laws could not hope to eradicate them without enraging the pulperos and those who depended upon them. Regulation of tlacos was the logical result of a policy that attempted to control the movement of wheat from farm to mill, flour from mill to bakery, and bread from bakery to store.
All groups associated with the bread trade engaged in an ongoing struggle for profits and control in the late eighteenth century. Against the backdrop of a rapidly expanding city whose food needs increased daily, the struggle became a test for local regulatory agencies, especially the Fiel Ejecutoría. From the evidence available, it might be justifiable to conclude that local government failed in maintaining an adequate supply òf good bread to the city. Old and new laws remained unenforced, rotten bread choked consumers, flies and vermin infested bread boxes, illegal profits and short weights delighted some, while making others suffer. The failure might be explained as another example of pecuniary interests influencing local officials, many of whom had investments in the activities they hoped to control. This is one way of interpreting late colonial politics, but one which is inadequate for understanding the struggles over bread. While all the evidence is not in, the way the politics of bread unfolded in the late eighteenth century suggests that instead of being the pliant tools of special· interests, local officials acted independently, seeking to balance the many forces affecting the supply of bread.
Two significant changes in the history of bread prompted officials to struggle persistently, if not always imaginatively, with bread problems. First, bread had become essential in the diet of the city, an item necessary for survival, with every ethnic group depending on it. Neglect of bread might lead to problems that encouraged social unrest. Not problems of inadequate harvests, but problems related to the illegal behavior of producers and distributors. Consumers knew that poor quality, short weights, and high prices were often caused by the manipulations of millers, bakers, and shopkeepers, not by the lack of wheat.
Mexico's increasing participation in an international bread trade does not invalidate the point, The central valleys of Mexico lay at one edge of a vast and inter-related network of grain production and exchange. Farmers and merchants shipped flour from the central basins to Veracruz, Campeche, Havana, New Orleans, and other cities. There Mexican flour competed with flour from the Upper Ohio Valley, actually as far away as the Monongahela River Valley in southwestern Pennsylvania, shipped down the Mississippi River to New Orleans, or shipped out of Philadelphia, New York, and Baltimore. The movement of flour (or hardtack) depended on a financial network geographically more far flung than the grain network. Accounts in Philadelphia, Madrid, London, and Hamburg might be juggled to send flour to Cuba to make hardtack for newly arrived recruits s9 . Despite the growth of the trade, it does not seem to have influenced the availability of wheat for bread in the city. At least the evidence reviewed makes no mention of shortages related to external relationships. Forces of production and distribution in the city had more influence on the availability of bread than international relationships.
The second change was the rise of the pulperos in bread politics. The clashes over the quality of bread, the privilege of selling floreado, and the use of tlacos paralleled the increasing number and strength of pulperos. The rise of the pulperos in the latter eighteenth century corresponded with the rapid growth of the capital. Pulperos became an indispensable part of a complex food system, moving products from producer to consumer. Pulperos soon recognized their importance to the survival of the city, using it at every opportunity to influence food policy.
It is within this context that bread policy has to be evaluated. Pulperos now competed with bakers, millers, and farmers for profits from bread. Local government had to balance the different groups in its attempt to honor the belief that good government assumes responsibility for the nutritional welfare of the populace. While the exact processes are not entirely clear, the outlines show an attempt to curtail abuses in all sectors, but not to the extent of changing their positions in the food system. At times the interests of panaderos received preference (often by neglect of laws), at other times those oí pulperos or molineros.
Municipal government did not have the resources to regulate all aspects of the bread trade at any given moment. Its inad- equacy did not lead to a collapse in the supply of bread. Instead, the system of distribution itself, the movement of grain from farm to mill to bakery to shop, susceptible as it was to fraud and deception, guaranteed the survival of the city. Under the jurisdiction of the Fiel Ejecutoria, no one group in the chain had the power to monopolize the provisioning of bread. Each group, even the marginal shopkeepers, had enough power to insure that it would not be completely overwhelmed by another. The competition of the different groups did not lead to a flawless system of production and exchange, but it did assure most Mexicans of their daily bread.
